The longwave economics perspective is, at its core, skeptical of much of the HS&J (hype shuck, and jive) that passes in transfictional media as fact. Despite my membership in a couple of journalistic groups, I don’t see much being able to change at the public perception level because when you start writing about how the game really runs, eyes glaze over, people nod off, and snoring is soon heard.
To counter this, I hereby create my news job title around here: NewsJay. Click here for the moodsetting music. Let it roll in a new tab, speakers up, and stay with me.l…
Now we can ramble: For the aware person, nothing is more exciting that figuring out “the truth” (whatever that is) in advance of the rest of the herd. It gives us (thinkers) time to reflect, consider bargains before prices run up, and so forth.
Oh, sure, anyone can made simple long-term decisions and win over time. Buying a “hard asset” like gold (when the Fed has been diluting purchasing power of the dollar by [on average] 3.25% per year since its founding in 1913. Or, simply buying stocks in companies with the largest “proven oil reserves” and waiting for the world to burn through the declining resource. Sure, those are likely winners long term.
But every so often, it helps to take the blinders off. And we will do that very publicly this morning by comparing two simple charts from the Federal Reserve that (together) reveal in stark ugliness why, if there is an economic recovery, you don’t have more money. It’s so simple even Ures truly can figure it out.
Step 1: Our first chart du jour, courtesy of the Federal Reserve of St. Louis excellent research resources, is to look at the the mortgage-backed securities PLUS the US Treasury securities held by the Federal Reserve. In other words, the asset side of their balance sheet:
OK, what does it mean? Well, it looks to me like at the lows of the 2009 post housing collapse, the Fed held about $500-billion of treasuries. Plus about zero in the way of mortgage-backed securities. Maybe as much at $600-billion (just over 1/2 a trillion) worth, if you want to be generous.
Fast forward to the latest data: We can eyeball that the Fed is (*much as a snake swallows its own tail) holding more than $2.2 trillion in Treasury assets plus the MBS portion is now pressing $1.5 trillion.
Time for simple arithmetic: This is rough and only the first cup of coffee, but looks like $3.7 trillion in Fed ownership of debt instruments.
Step 2: Next, we look at the Gross Domestic Product through Q2 of 2013, and we can estimate that the reason that it feels like there has been no economic recovery is the simple reason that the increase in GDP has been directly proportional to the combined growth of Fed Treasury and MBS. Say, how about that?
Which gets us to our great ponder of this morning ( or the groB fragge heute for our Swiss gnome-schoolers):
What is the Fed’s exit strategy?
In other words, is there some logical limit beyond which the Fed cannot keep buying up all the pieces on the Monopoly board, now that the Chinese are not buying enough US Treasuries to matter nor enough MBS for us to play the game of “hot potato” with them?
There may be no technical reason that the Fed can’t continue to increase its holdings in an effort to maintain the illusion of recovery which includes a stock market that just had a “paint the tape day” this week, trying to bust out to the upside, and when that failed, reality snuck in following.
This (newsjay: living in the background) “How do we clean up after ourselves?” issue was mentioned in the December Fed minutes that came out this week that read in part:
“Further, participants noted that ongoing asset purchases could increase the difficulty of managing exit from the current highly accommodative policy stance when the time came. Many participants, however, expressed confidence in the tools at the Federal Reserve’s disposal for managing its balance sheet and for normalizing the stance of policy at the appropriate time. Regarding the marginal efficacy of the purchase program, most participants viewed the program as continuing to support accommodative financial conditions, with a number of them pointing to the importance of purchases in serving to enhance the credibility of the Committee’s forward guidance about the target federal funds rate. A majority of participants judged that the marginal efficacy of purchases was likely declining as purchases continue, although some noted the difficulty inherent in making such an assessment. A couple of participants thought that the marginal efficacy of the program was not declining, as evidenced by the substantial effects in financial markets in recent months of news about the likely path of purchases. “
I believe the Fed has made a “deal with the Devil” that will come back to haunt us within a couple of years. Yes, this is a long-term view, but what the Fed faces is really a two-part problem which has an analogy in drug rehab treatment.
The first problem is: How to ratchet down the quantitative easings to zero. The first step. If they mention slowing their asset-buying largess, the markets will tank.
Then, the second problem arrives: How to divest of those assets…or do all mortgages eventually belong to the government and say, isn’t that how the Soviet system ran? Or, with an ex-Berkeley Fed chair is this the new plan?
As we look at the Challenger job cuts report (next item) it strikes me that as busy as sitting members of the Federal Reserve were, back in the day, getting their fine academic credentials, they may have missed the 1968 musical Oliver! which asks the question in music that we are asking ourselves this morning. (Go ahead, play it in the background and keep reading…)
With declining disposable, the LBGT movement getting traction (thus reducing birth rates) and bringing the “new coupling” plus the arrival of additional robotics and workplace automation, no to mention 3D food printers like the ones being shown at CES in Las Vegas this morning, and what about New Minimalists? Just who will buy all those assets piling up on the Fed’s balance sheet? The public with its collapsing disposable income driven to the gutter by the healthcare tax? Not bloody likely.
But that’s easily solved, of course: We’ll just pretend (for statistical purposes) that healthcare is not a tax and that buying healthcare is optional. That way, it won’t appear that we’re in trouble.
“There’ll never be a day so sunny,
It could not happen twice.
Where is the man with all the money?
It’s cheap at half the price!