Elaine thinks I was being lazy this weekend, Lounging in my overstuffed leather recliner, staring at the big screen computer display once in a while, I can see where that might be the impression.
But the reality is I’ve been doing a lot of deep-thinking on the application of neural networks to markets. Multilayered feed-forwards, and other such tools, as gaming the market takes a lot of time.
Today, the Dow figures to tack on 50-points in the early going today – ostensibly for any number of “headline reasons” including:
Election in Ukraine is behind us. Still, this could blow up again this week as dozens of pro-Russian fighters died in Donetsk.
The right (small /EU/ groups made gains in European Union voting, but it could have been worse. Global world government lite seems to be the fallback chatter.
And oh, another mass/outrage killing will spur more gun control discussion.
Fine, on the surface. But there’s something much more serious going on.
Math.
There’s a dirt simple equation for rising markets and it works out thisaway:
Say you have one share of a stock and it is earning $1.
If the prevailing investment environment is giving people returns of 10%, then you would own $10-dollar stock. The markets are competitive like this.
But, suppose that you still have $1 worth of earnings and the prevailing yield of competing investment choices drops to 5%. What happens to the stock price? It tends to rise to $20. (Ceteris paribus, all other things being equal.)
Now suppose that the same $1 worth of earnings exists and the prevailing interest rate drops to just 2%. What is the stock price likely to be (again, cet.par.)? $50!!!
So the Big Story that no one is explaining worth a crap behind the headlines is that the reason stocks could hit new highs is that rates are heading toward deeper, lower, lows!
If this was only a US phenomena, it wouldn’t spell global economic disaster down the road (when rates rise)., But look out! When rates do begin to rise, then things will turn exactly the other direction and what has been the “virtuous cycle” will turn into a vicious cycle.
And that gets us to the most important financial lynchpin story of the morning: “Europe’s deflation threat may be growing” says the Boston Globe.
Provided companies can hang on to at least some earnings, record Dow highs are just ahead, as are highs in the S&P. The NASDAQ has some catch up to do, but we could be in one of those “Summer of ‘29” events shortly.
I don’t say this lightly. The greatest challenge the Federal Reserve will have to face over the next three years will be how to manage the eventual “turn” in rates. Put simply, rates will have to reverse as some point, or the world collapses in a heap.
But if they get it even slightly wrong, as happened when rates were being raised in 1929, things can collapse – globally.
Here’s a snip from a San Francisco Federal Reserve Bank Economic Letter “Monetary Policy and the Great Crash of 1929: A Bursting Bubble or Collapsing Fundamentals?” (From 1999):
“Price-dividend ratios continued to fall until July 1929, but then prices began to take off. In August, the Fed raised the discount rate by another percentage point to 6%. The stock market peaked in the first week of September. It is worth noting that at its peak the price-dividend ratio was 32.8, which is well below values reached in the 1960s or 1990s. Share prices declined in a more or less orderly fashion until the end of October, but then the market crashed. From its peak, the price-dividend ratio fell roughly 30%, to a level roughly similar to that prevailing at the beginning of 1928, when the Fed began to tighten.
In the immediate aftermath of the crash, the New York Fed took prompt and decisive action to ease credit conditions. When investors attempted to liquidate their equity holdings, many lenders also called their loans to securities brokers. With the encouragement of officials at the New York Fed, many of these brokers’ loans were taken over by New York banks, who were allowed to borrow freely at the discount window for this purpose. The New York Fed also bought government securities on its own account in order to inject reserves into the banking system. In this way, they were able to contain an incipient liquidity crisis and prevent the crash from spreading to money markets.